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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred on the Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-3-102(3)Q). The Supreme Court has transferred this appeal to the Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Utah R. Civ. P. 83(a)(l)(B)

"does not permit the Court to find that a person has re-litigated the same issue of law or
fact as an issue of law or fact not raised in the case before it." Ruling and Order on
Defendant's Motion for Relief Under Rule 83 (Vexatious Litigant) (herein, the "Rule 83
Ruling"), R. 1834 at 183 7, Add. Ex. B at 4. In other words, whether the trial court erred in
concluding that the phrase "the claim" as used in Utah R. Civ. P. 83(a)(l)(B) "must also
be at issue in the present action." R. 1836.

Standard of Review: Correctness. Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 909 P .2d 271,
@

272 (Utah App. 1995) ("This appeal turns on the interpretation of Rule 47 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and, thus, presents a question oflaw" which is reviewed for correctness).
Issue No. 2: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Michael Strand's litigation

of the issue of ownership of the Pages Lane Property cannot constitute a basis for finding
him to be a vexatious litigant under Utah R. Civ. P. 83(a)(l)(B) where Nupetco
demonstrated three instances of Strand's re-litigation of that issue, acting without
representation.

Standard of Review: De novo. Because the operative facts were undisputed, the
hearing and decision on the Rule 83 motion were equivalent to a summary judgment matter,
in which "we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most

favorable to [the non-moving party], and we give no deference to the trial court's decision."
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48, ,r 3, 89 P.3d 97. Whether a party is
entitled to summary judgment is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. See
Mitchell v. Christensen, 2001 UT 80, 31 P.3d 572.
Issue No. 3: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Utah R. Civ. P. 83(a)(l)(C)

•

"allows the Court to review only Mr. Strand's filings in the action in which the Rule 83
~

motion was brought." Rule 83 Ruling at 5.
Standard of Review: Correctness. Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 909 P .2d 271,

272 (Utah App. 1995) ("This appeal turns on the interpretation of Rule 47 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and, thus, presents a question of law" which is reviewed for correctness).
THE ISSUES WERE PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT

Nupetco asserted in its Motion for Relief Under Rule 83 (Vexatious Litigants),
R. 233, and Verified Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief Under Rule 83, R.237,
and 39 exhibits thereto, R. 280-670 that Michael Strand ("Strand") is a vexatious litigant.
Strand responded with Verified Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Relief Under
Rule 83, R. 853, 193 pages of exhibits, R. 909 to 1102, and Errata to Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Relief Under Rule 83, R.1108. Nupetco filed a Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief Under Rule 83, R. 1121. A hearing on the
Motion was held, R. 1305, Transcript, R. 2138. The Court entered the Rule 83 Ruling,
denying Nupetco's Motion. R. 1834.

•
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RULE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL

The interpretation of Rule 83, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative of the
appeal. The pertinent portions of the Rule are set forth here; due to its length, the entire
Rule is set forth in the Addendum.
(a)(l) The court may find a person to be a "vexatious litigant" if the person,
including an attorney acting pro se, without legal representation, does any of the
following:
(a)(l)(B) After a claim for relief or an issue of fact or law in the claim has been
finally determined, the person two or more additional times re-litigates or attempts
to re-litigate the claim, the issue of fact or law, or the validity of the determination
against the same party in whose favor the claim or issue was determined.
(a)(l)(C) In any action, the person three or more times does any one or any
combination of the following:
(a)(l)(C)(i) files unmeritorious pleadings or other papers,
(a)(l )(C)(ii) files pleadings or other papers that contain redundant,
immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter,
(a)(l)(C)(iii) conducts unnecessary discovery or discovery that is not
proportional to what is at stake in the litigation, or
(a)(l)(C)(iv) engages in tactics that are frivolous or solely for the purpose
of harassment or delay.
(a)(2) "Claim" and "claim for relief' mean a petition, complaint, counterclaim,
cross claim or third-party complaint.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.

Michael Strand ("Strand"), individually and in a purported representative capacity
as general partner and "last surviving partner" ofB. I. Associates, as well as B.I. Associates
itself, commenced a quiet title action against Kent Alderman, Personal Representative
("Alderman") of Strand's mother's estate, and Nupetco Associates, LLC ("Nupetco")

regarding property located in West Bountiful, Davis County, Utah, commonly called
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"Pages Lane." Nupetco had received a deed to the property from Alderman. Nupetco
requested that the trial court determine that Michael Strand is a "vexatious litigant" under
Rule 83, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below.

After a hearing on Nupetco's Motion for Relief Under Rule 83, Judge Hamilton
issued a "Ruling and Order on Defendant's Motion for Relief Under Rule 83," (R. 1946)
denying the motion. Nupetco filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Order
Release of Lis Pendens, which were opposed by Strand. After a hearing on the latter
motions, Judge Hamilton granted those motions, determined that Nupetco was the owner
of the property, and that "Strand (in any capacity) and B. I. Associates, as well as any
person claiming by, through or under them, have no right, title, interest or estate in or to
the Property." R. 1948-49, ,I 13. Strand appealed from that decision; his appeal was rejected
March 3, 2016 in an Order of Summary Affirmance by the Court of Appeals.
Statement of Facts.
Introduction

While there is an extensive history of litigation between Strand and Nupetco
(including its subsidiary, Golden Meadows Properties, L.C., and its former Manager,
Neuman C. Petty), a description of just four prior cases referred to in this Brief will be
helpful in understanding the facts and claims regarding Nupetco's motion that Strand be
determined to be a "vexatious litigant."

1.

Eleanor Strand Probate Case. Vern and Eleanor Strand, as joint tenants,

owned about ten acres of property in West Bountiful, Utah ("Pages Lane"), acquired in

4

i)

1952. R. 281. They had four children, Jerry Strand, Mike Strand, Rex Strand, and Diane
DiMeo. In 1982 Murray First Thrift made a loan to Vern, Eleanor, Mike, and entities in
which Mike was a principal, secured by the Pages Lane property. Nupetco later purchased
the loan. Vern died on February 11, 1987. R. 287. Eleanor died a few weeks later. The
children took no action to administer the estate of Eleanor Strand, presumably because
there was no equity in Pages Lane or other property owned by the estate. Years later when
DiMeo believed that the statute of limitations precluded enforcement of Nupetco' s Trust
Deed, she filed a petition in 2006 seeking her appointment as personal representative of
Eleanor's estate (commencing Probate Case No. 063600007 in the Second District Court
@

for Davis County, Utah). On March 25, 2014, after resolution of the quiet title action on
Pages Lane, case number 2, next below, Golden Meadows Properties, L.C. ("Golden
Meadows") was substituted in the Eleanor Strand Probate case for Mike Strand (his

inheritance having been acquired by assignment from Wayne Clark, to whom Strand had
assigned it, and by execution by Golden Meadows) and for Jerry Strand and Diane DiMeo
(purchased by Golden Meadows, Nupetco's subsidiary).
2.

Eleanor Strand Probate Case. In the Eleanor Strand Probate case, DiMeo

was granted leave to file a case to quiet title to Pages Lane. DiMeo commenced the action

("2006 quiet title action") in 2006, Case No. 060700354 in the Second District Court of
Davis County. On cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge Morris held that Nupetco's
Trust Deed was barred by the statute of limitations. Nupetco appealed. The Utah Court of
@

Appeals reversed, holding the note secured by the Trust Deed was valid and enforceable,
as Mike Strand's payments had extended the running of the statute oflimitations. The case

5

was remanded "with instructions to grant partial summary judgment in favor of Nupetco
and to reinstate Nupetco' s counterclaim seeking foreclosure of the trust deed, as well as to
permit its amendment." 2013 UT App 188, ,r 11,309 P.3d 251.
3.

Bountiful House Eviction Case. In Golden Meadows Properties, L.C. v.

Michael Strand and Cari Allen, in the Second District Court of Davis County, Case No.
070700488, filed August 30, 2007, Golden Meadows sought to evict Strand and Cari Allen
from a house in Bountiful, Utah. This is referred to as the "eviction case." As set forth
below in more detail, Strand and Allen were removed from the house pursuant to an Order
of Restitution, and an Amended Summary Judgment (R. 295) was entered against them on
July 15, 2008. Strand appealed; the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Judgment. Golden

Meadows Properties LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App 257. In another appeal, on the
"disqualification" issue discussed below, Strand appealed an adverse ruling, which was
affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals, 2010 UT App 258,241 P. 3d 371. Meanwhile, a
Writ of Execution was issued and on November 24, 2008 Constable Robert J. Reitz levied
upon and sold at public auction (referred to herein as the "execution sale") to Golden
Meadows Strand's claims and causes of action against Neuman Petty, Nupetco, and all
other "Neuman Petty entities," including all claims asserted in Strand v. Petty, et al., Civil
No. 070915796, pending in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County (the "joint venture

suit''), discussed as case number 4, immediately below. Golden Meadows filed a Motion
to Determine Validity of Execution Sale , which was held valid in an Order Determining
Validity of Execution Sale and Denying Motion to Set Aside Execution Sale on May 19,
2011 entered by Judge Dawson (the "May 19 Order").
6
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•
4.

On November 6, 2007, Stand filed a Verified Complaint titled Michael

Strand, individually and as successor in interest to Mingo Oil Company, Mingo Oil
Producers, and other Michael Strand entities v. Neuman Petty, Nupetco Associates, and
Kamco Wyoming Corporation, and other Neuman Petty entities, in the Third District Court
of Salt Lake County, Case No. 070915796.

Stand asserted a joint venture between

(a) himself and/or the "Strand entities" and (b) Neuman Petty and/or the ''Neuman Petty

•

entities." Although the defendants denied any joint venture, the case is referred to herein
for convenience as the ''joint venture suit." The case was first assigned to Judge Iwasaki
and later to Judge Kennedy. After Golden Meadows executed on Strand's claims in the

(i,

joint venture suit, as discussed in the execution sale portion of paragraph 3, above, Golden
Meadows was substituted as plaintiff in Strand's place, and Nupetco and Golden Meadows
stipulated to dismissal of the case with prejudice; Judge Kennedy entered the dismissal
order. R. 394. Strand missed the deadline to appeal, but filed a Motion for Relief, relying
on Rule 60(b), which was denied by Judge Kennedy. Strand appealed. The Utah Court of
Appeals affirmed. R. 419. Strand's petition for certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court was
denied, Case No. 20130319.
Facts

In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief Under Rule 83 (R. 23 7),
Nupetco established the following facts:
I.

Golden Meadows commenced the eviction case against Strand on

August 30, 2007, in the Second District Court for Davis County (Case No. 070700488).
Strand filed a counterclaim which included a claim to quiet title to the subject property in
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Bountiful, Utah ("Bountiful House"). After discovery, Judge Glen R. Dawson granted
Golden Meadows' Motion for Summary Judgment and issued an Order of Restitution,
pursuant to which Strand was removed from the Bountiful residence. The court entered an
Amended Summary Judgment (R. 295) on July 15, 2008, granting a money judgment
against Strand in the amount of $152,901.15. Strand filed a Rule 59 motion, which was
denied. He then appealed. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Golden

Meadows Properties, LC v. Strand, 20 IO UT App 257.
2.

On October 14, 2008, in the eviction case, Strand filed a Motion for

Disqualification Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 63 ("Motion to Disqualify"), alleging that
Judge Dawson was prejudiced against him. At the same time he filed a Rule 60(b) Motion

•

for Relief from Judgment, which relied entirely upon the Motion to Disqualify in seeking
to set aside the Amended Summary Judgment. The Motion to Disqualify was referred to
Judge Thomas L. Kay, who issued a Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Disqualify on
October 31, 2008, stating, among other things, that "[T]here has been no showing that
Judge Dawson had any conflict of interest or that he was biased or prejudiced." R. 310.
3.

Strand appealed from Judge Kay's ruling on the Motion to Disqualify, and

the Court of Appeals affirmed. Golden Meadows Properties, LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App
258, ,I 7 ("Although we affirm on the ground that Strand's recusal motion was untimely,

•

we note our agreement with Judge Kay that Strand has not demonstrated that Judge
Dawson was biased or prejudiced in any degree."). The Court of Appeals added that ''Judge
Dawson's prior involvement with Strand [when Judge Dawson was an Assistant U.S.
Attorney] falls far short of the level of involvement mandating recusal." Id. Strand's

8

•

petition for certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court was denied. Case 20100935, 247 P.3d
i>

774.
4.

Pursuant to a Writ of Execution issued on October 7, 2008, Constable Robert

J. Reitz, levied upon and sold at public auction to Golden Meadows on November 24, 2008
(the "Execution Sale") any and all claims and causes of action of Michael Strand against
Neuman Petty, Nupetco and all other "Neuman Petty entities," including all claims asserted
or which could have been asserted in Strand vs. Petty, et al., Civil No. 070915796, pending
in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County (claiming $11 million based on an alleged
joint venture to produce oil). A copy of Strand's Complaint in that action is found at R. 313.
•

5.

Golden Meadows filed a Motion to Determine Validity of Execution Sale on

November 10, 2010. On February 24, 2011, Strand filed pro se a Motion to Set Aside
Execution Sale. After extensive briefing on both motions, Judge Dawson issued a Ruling
on April 20, 2011, and entered an Order Determining Validity of Execution Sale and
Denying Motion to Set Aside Execution Sale on May 19, 2011 (the "May 19 Order").
First Attempt to Re-litigate the Disqualification Issue
6.

Strand attempted to re-litigate the disqualification issue in multiple instances.

The first, including an appeal, arose from a pro se "Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial and
for Findings by the Court; Correction of Record" (the "Motion for New Trial") filed on
June 3,2011, seeking reconsideration of the May 19 Order.
a.

In the supporting Memorandum Strand asked Judge Dawson to

"disclose the information, knowledge, and disqualifying facts that may exist from
[his] prior involvement in the matter of the tax indebtedness of Mingo Oil

9

Company" as a "former U.S. Attorney." He complained that he had to guess "why
this court is not prejudiced from its previous involvement in 1989 with Mr. Strand
and his entities (Mingo Oil Company, Mingo Oil Producers, BI Associates ad MLK
Investments) .... " R. 337.
b.

The Motion for New Trial was denied by Ruling filed August 12,

2011, and by the Order Denying Motion for New Trial and for Findings by the Court
entered September 2, 2011. Strand filed a Notice of Appeal on September 14, 2011.
That appeal was designated as Case No. 20110839-CA.
c.

In his prose appeal designated as Case No. 20110839-CA, Strand

identified as the "first issue" the question "[ w ]hether Judge Dawson's rulings and

(i)

orders are void." Docketing Statement dated October 5, 2011 (R. 346). He argued
that "the disqualification of a judge [Judge Dawson] is of a nature that cannot be
waived" and that "the acts of that disqualified judge are absolutely void." Id.
d.

The Utah Court of Appeals issued a Per Curiam Decision on

December 8, 201 1, affirming Judge Dawson's denial of a new trial. Golden
Meadows Properties, L.C. v. Strand, 2011 UT App 421. It rejected Strand's attempt
to re-litigate the disqualification issue, saying, "Appellants also sought to revisit
issues from their prior appeals in this case, including Golden Meadows Properties,
L.C. v. Strand, 2010 UT App 258, 241 P.3d 371 [affirming denial of the Motion to

Disqualify]. Because such issues were previously resolved by this court, we do not
address them."
Second Attempt to Re-litigate the Disqualification Issue
10

®>

7.

In May of 2011, Strand filed a Civil Rights Complaint against Judge Dawson

in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Case No. 1: 11-cv-00077. He
alleged therein that Judge Dawson had "obvious bias and prejudice against Mr. Strand."

<t

Strand asked the federal court to order that Judge Dawson was not qualified to act in the
eviction case and prayed for an order requiring Judge Dawson to recuse himself in the
eviction case. R. 354. Strand's action was dismissed based on judicial immunity. R. 367.
Third Attempt to Re-litigate the Disqualification Issue

8.

On January 17, 2012, in the eviction case Strand filed pro se a Motion for

Relief from Judgment or Order and a Motion to Dismiss together with a supporting
Memorandum for both motions. He argued that "Judge Dawson is not authorized to sit in
this case and has an absolute legal duty to disqualify himself .... " R. 374. Judge Dawson
treated the Motion to Dismiss as a motion for disqualification and certified such motion to
Judge Kay for review under Rule 63(b)(2). On February 24, 2012, Judge Kay issued a
Ruling on Petitioner's Motion to Disqualify, denying disqualification. R. 385.
a.

Strand appealed the Ruling twice. The first appeal was dismissed for

lack ofjurisdiction in Case No. 20120273, and his request for certiorari was denied.
The second appeal resulted in an Order of Summary Affirmance (R. 390) on
September 28, 2012, in Case No. 20120372. The Court of Appeals stated that Strand
had provided "no explanation of how Judge Dawson's representation of the IRS in
a matter involving two Strand-owned entities that occurred prior to his appointment
to the bench and almost twenty years ago required Judge Dawson to recuse himself."

11

Id. Strand petitioned for rehearing and then for certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court.

Both were denied.
Fourth Attempt to Re-litigate the Disqualification Issue
9.

After Golden Meadows executed on Strand's claims in the joint venture suit,

Golden Meadows was substituted in his stead as plaintiff in that case. Judge Kennedy
dismissed Strand's claims with prejudice. R. 394. Strand missed his deadline to appeal but
filed a pro se Motion for Relief from the substitution order, relying on Rule 60(b). In his
supporting Memorandum Strand argued that "Judge Dawson was automatically
disqualified from the state court action at the moment it came before him and his orders
are void " because of Judge Dawson's work as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in cases
involving IRS matters for Strand entities. R. 398 at 403.
a.

Judge Kennedy denied the Rule 60(b) motion, and Strand appealed

pro se. In an Order of Summary Affirmance, the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court ruled correctly in denying the motion. Case No. 20120738. R. 419. Strand's
petition for certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court was denied in Case No. 20130319.
Fifth Attempt to Re-litigate the Disqualification Issue
10.

In the eviction case Golden Meadows caused an execution sale to be

conducted on April 22, 2014, at which Golden Meadows purchased Strand's inheritance
rights, his frivolous malpractice suit against Wayne Petty and all other claims and causes
of action belonging to Strand. Golden Meadows then moved for a determination of the
validity of that execution sale, and Judge Dawson ruled that the sale was valid. Strand filed
a Rule 59 Motion on May 15, 2014, seeking reconsideration of that ruling and supported it
12
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with the May 20, 2014, pro se Affidavit of Michael Strand in Support of Rule 59 Motion.
~

R. 424.
a.

In that affidavit, Strand asserted that "Judge Dawson denied me my

right to conduct an evidentiary hearing because he has an ulterior motive to preclude
my evidence and my testimony," relied upon accusations of "Judge Dawson's
judicial misconduct," and argued that "he is mandatorily disqualified from presiding
over this case." Id.
b.

,r 14.

In the same affidavit Strand accused Judge Dawson of ruling based on

"passion and prejudice" (id.
"bias" and "prejudice"
c.

,r,r l 8{a) and 19) and "personal bias" (if 20), as well as

(,r,r 21 and 24).

On May 20, 2014, in the eviction case Strand filed prose the Affidavit

of Cari Allen in Support of Rule 59 Motion. R. 438. It contains the following
passages:
Rather than correct his wrong rulings, Judge Dawson keeps on
victimizing me and Mr. Strand, and Judge Dawson keeps on allowing
Golden Meadows to victimize, demean, and harass us, through their
disingenuous words and their bogus actions - for his own improper
personal motives and benefit. It is clear to me that there is a conspiracy
between Judge Dawson, Judge Kay, and Golden Meadows (James
Swindler and Wayne Petty) to continue to deprive me and Mr. Strand
of our right to due process.
Id.

,r 12.
Four Attempts to Re-litigate Validity of November 2008 Execution Sale
11.

Strand attempted to re-litigate the validity of the November 2008 Execution

Sale at least four times, including:
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a.

In his June 3, 2011, Rule 59 Motion for New Trial and supporting

Memorandum filed prose in the eviction case (see iJ 6 above), Strand sought to relitigate Ju~ge Dawson's determination that the November 24, 2008 execution sale
was valid. R. 337 at 337, 339-40.
b.

When Strand's Motion for New Trial was denied, he appealed and the

Court of Appeals affirmed. Golden Meadows Properties, L.C. v. Strand, 2011 UT
App 421, December 8, 2011 (upholding the validity of the execution sale and

•

affirming the denial of Strand's Motion for New Trial).
c.

In the joint venture suit before Judge Kennedy, as noted above,

Golden Meadows was substituted in place of Strand as plaintiff. Strand filed a pro

se Motion for Relief relying on Rule 60(b). In his supporting Memorandum Strand
argued that "Judge Dawson's orders are void," attacking Judge Dawson's
determination of validity of the execution sale, as well as the original eviction ruling
and money judgment contained in the Amended Summary Judgment. R. 398 at 415.
Judge Kennedy denied the Rule 60(b) motion, and Strand appealed pro se. In an
Order of Summary Affirmance, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court ruled
correctly in denying the motion R. 419. Strand's petition for certiorari to the Utah
Supreme Court was denied in Case No. 20130319.
d.

In May of 2011, Strand filed a Civil Rights Complaint against Judge

Dawson in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Case No. 1: 1 lcv-00077. R. 354. He alleged therein that Judge Dawson's rulings on Strand's quiet
title claim in the eviction case and on his defenses to eviction were erroneous. Strand
14
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asked the federal court to order that any judgments and actions taken in that case
should be "set aside as a violation of Plaintiffs due process rights and equal
protection." He asked for an order requiring Judge Dawson to vacate all of his orders
in the eviction case. Id.

Four Attempts to Re-Litigate the July 2008 Amended Summary Judgment
and its Validity
12.

<i

Following Judge Dawson's Amended Summary Judgment in the eviction

case on July 15, 2008 (R. 295), Strand took a prose appeal, in which the Utah Court of
Appeals affirmed Judge Dawson's rulings in their entirety on September 23, 2010. Golden

Meadows Properties, L.C. v. Strand, 2010 UT App 257. Thereafter, Strand attempted to
re-litigate the Amended Judgment at least four times, acting prose:
a.

In the joint venture suit before Judge Kennedy, as noted above,

Golden Meadows was substituted in place of Strand as plaintiff. On April 27, 2012
Strand filed a pro se Motion for Relief relying on Rule 60(b ). In his supporting
Memorandum (R. 398 at415) Strand argued that "Judge Dawson's orders are void,"
attacking Judge Dawson's Amended Summary Judgment. In particular, Strand
argued that the sale of the home to Log Furniture, Inc. 1 "was a sham transaction."
R. 407. He also attacked Judge Dawson's ruling as to the statute of limitations.
Strand argued that the "judgment and orders entered by Judge Dawson are void ...
[and] do not affect title to property." R. 415.

®

Strand's claim regarding Log Furniture, Inc. was addressed specifically in the Amended
Summary Judgment. See R. 298, ,r 11; R. 299, ,r 15 including footnote 1. ,r,r 16, 17; R.
300, ,r,r 19-21.

®

15

1

b.

In May of 2011, Strand filed a Civil Rights Complaint against Judge

Dawson in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Case No. 1: 11cv-00077. R. 354. He alleged therein that Judge Dawson's rulings on Strand's quiet
title claim in the eviction case and on his defenses to eviction were erroneous. Strand
asked the federal court to order that any judgments and actions taken in that case
should be "set aside as a violation of Plaintiffs due process rights and equal
protection." R. 365. He asked for an order requiring Judge Dawson to vacate all of
his orders in the eviction case.
c.

On May 20, 2014, before Judge Dawson in the eviction case, Strand

submitted the Affidavit of Cari Allen in Support of Rule 59 Motion, which argued
that Judge Dawson's July 2008 ruling that Strand's quiet title claim was barred by
limitations was incorrect, resulting in a denial of due process and "victimization" of
Strand and Allen. Strand, by way of Allen's affidavit, further contended that the LFI
acquisition of the Bountiful home was "not [an] arm's length business transaction."
R. 438 at if 12, 14.

d.

On October 3, 2014, Strand filed a Notice of Appeal, in which he

appealed from Judge Dawson's orders entered during 2014 with respect to validity
of the April 22, 2014, execution sale. His appeal is currently pending as Case No.
20140983-CA.
Ownership of Pages Lane Property and Attempts to Re-Litigate Same
13.

In the Eleanor Strand Estate case, the court entered a final order entitled

Determination of Heirs on March 7, 2006 ruling, among other things, that Eleanor Strand
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owned the land and buildings located at 680 West Pages Lane, West Bountiful, Utah (the
(@

"Pages Lane") at the time of her death. R. 482. In the same case, Strand filed an Affidavit

in June 2007 admitting that the Property belonged to Eleanor Strand's estate. R. 486 at

,r,r 13 and 19. Numerous attempts to re-litigate the issue followed:
a.

On January 29, 2015 Strand initiated this case in the district court by

filing a pro se Complaint (R. 1) for himself and (in violation of the prohibition on
the unauthorized practice oflaw) B.I. Associates, alleging that B.I. Associates is the
owner of the Property and seeking quiet title to the property against Kent Alderman,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of Eleanor Strand. Complaint

,r 7.

The

Complaint seeks a judgment quieting title to the Pages Lane Property in B.I.
Associates. Id. at 3-4. 2

To give context to this attempt to re-litigate, one should be aware of another action
previously commenced and pursued by Strand. On November 20, 2012, Strand, using
Nathan Drage as counsel, filed a Petition to Probate Will in a case entitled In the Matter of
the Estate of Vern C. Strand, Case No. 123700456, in the Second District Court for Davis
County, in which he sought to probate a will of his father, Vern Strand. R. 494. In it Strand
alleged in a statement verified under oath that Vern "left property in Davis County" and
provided a legal description thereof, referring to it as "the Pages Lane Property." Id. at ,r,r
5-6. The final order in Vern's case came in Judge Dale's ruling that the Property passed by
operation of law to Eleanor Strand at the death of Vern. Order dated January 9, 2014.
R. 500. Strand appealed from that Order, which was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals,
2015 UT App 259.
Further, despite these final determinations as to ownership of the Property, on
September 24, 2014, Strand, using Nathan Drage as counsel, filed a pleading in Case No.
060700354 pending before Judge Morris (on remand from the Utah Court of Appeals, 2013
UT App 188) entitled "Answer to Nupetco Associates Counterclaim and Counterclaim."
R. 506. In that pleading Strand claimed that the Property belonged to B.I. Associates, which
he claimed to be a partnership. That action was dismissed by Judge Morris on January 28,
2015. Strand's prose appeal was dismissed by Order of the Utah Court of Appeals dated
May 28, 2015.

2

~

@

~

17

b.

On February 4, 2015, Strand filed a prose "Emergency Petition for

Extraordinary Writ" for himself and B .I. Associates (again in violation of the
prohibition against the unauthorized practice oflaw) in the Utah Court of Appeals.
R. 541. Strand stated in that Petition that "B.I. Associates is (since 1982) and at all
times herein mentioned was, the owner and actual possessor of the [Pages Lane
Property]." R. 546. He argued that the Probate Court did not have jurisdiction to
allow the Personal Representative to take possession of "property that belongs to
nonparties to the case." R. 554. He further argued that this Court's order violated
Strand's and B.I. Associates' due process rights because B.I. Associates holds the
Property as a partnership asset. R.551, ,I 19. The writ was denied by the Utah Court
of Appeals in an Order filed February 13, 2015, Case No. 20150087-CA. A request
for further review was denied by Order entered February 18, 2015. Strand' s Petition
for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court was denied by Order filed July 1,
2015, Case No. 20150318-SC.
C.

Also on February 4, 2015, Strand filed a prose Petition for Writ of

Mandamus for himself and B.I. Associates in the Utah Court of Appeals, seeking a
writ compelling Judge Morris to reinstate the Strand/BJ. Associates Counterclaim
described in footnote 2 above. R. 560. In it he claimed again "that the Pages Lane
Property is a partnership asset of B.I. Associates." R. 568. The writ was denied by
the Utah Court of Appeals by Order filed February 23, 2015, Case No. 20150091CA. Strand's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court was denied
by Order filed July 1, 2015, Case No. 20150343-SC.
18
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Facts Showing Violations of Rule 83(a)(l)(C) in the Eviction Case
14.

In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief Under Rule 83 (R. 237),

Nupetco showed Strand's violations of Rule 83(a)(l)(C) in the following instances:
a.

Unmeritorious Paper. Strand filed a Motion to Set Counter

Possession Bond (R. 586) and a supporting Memorandum (R. 589) on September
27, 2007, proposing a counter possession bond of $1.00 or alternatively offering a
disputed claim of Cari Allen as a form of bond. In an Order Regarding Counter
Bond filed on November 6, 2007, Judge Dawson rejected both proposals and
required a bond of$6,250.00 in the form required by applicable rule (cash, corporate
surety, certified funds or property bond complying with applicable rules). R. 600.
b.

Unmeritorious Paper Containing Impertinent and Immaterial Matter.

On November 9, 2007, Strand filed Defendants' Disclosure of Lay Witnesses,
listing 38 witnesses and, with respect to nearly all of them, failing to provide a
summary of their testimony and stating it would be determined "on deposition."
R. 603. Strand took no depositions in the case and offered affidavits of only a
handful of the 3 8 witnesses.
c.

Unmeritorious Papers for Unnecessary Discovery. On January 8,

2008, Strand filed a Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories; Request for
Suspension of the Court's Scheduling Order and Request for Sanctions, seeking to
compel answers to all 23 of his interrogatories (amounting to 68 discrete subparts)
even though nine had been fully answered, another four had been partially answered
and the remainder were improperly directed at non-parties. The motion sought to
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abort the Court's Scheduling Order and prolong discovery even though Strand had
waited until the last day on which discovery requests were permitted to be made.
Judge Dawson denied the motion in full, ruling that Strand was "abusing the
discovery process" and awarded attorney fees to Golden Meadows. R. 610.
d.

Unmeritorious Papers for Unnecessary Discovery. On January 8,

2008, Strand filed a Motion to Compel Production of Documents; Request for
Suspension of the Court's Scheduling Order and Request for Sanctions, seeking to
compel production of documents described in 62 requests for production, including
numerous categories of documents that were not within the possession, custody or
control of Golden Meadows and extensive irrelevant documentation. The motion
sought to abort the Court's Scheduling Order and prolong discovery even though
Strand had waited until the last day on which discovery requests were permitted to
be made. Judge Dawson denied the motion in full, ruling that Strand was "abusing
the discovery process" and awarded attorney fees to Golden Meadows. Id.
e.

Unmeritorious Papers. Strand filed a Motion for Stay and Motion to

Enlarge Time to Respond to Motion for Summary Judgment and a supporting
Memorandum on January 29, 2008, asking the Court to stay the eviction case
pending disposition of the above-described frivolous Motions to Compel. R. 614.
Golden Meadows had filed a Motion for Summary Judgment two weeks previously,
and Strand sought to delay eviction by requesting an extension of time to respond
to that Motion until 15 days after a ruling on the Motions to Compel. This delay
tactic failed in that the Motion to Stay was denied.
20
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f.

Unmeritorious Papers. Strand filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure

to Join Indispensable Parties on February 13, 2008, arguing that Golden Meadows'
Complaint (which simply sought to evict Strand and Allen from the residence)
should be dismissed for failure of Golden Meadows to joint Nupetco, Neuman Petty,
Wayne Petty and Ralph Petty. R. 621. This motion was not only frivolous but was
filed in extreme bad faith in view of the fact that Golden Meadows had asserted the
defense of failure to join indispensable parties in its Reply to Strand's Counterclaim.
Months later (after the motion cutoff date had passed and discovery was closed),
Strand attempted to have the Court punish Golden Meadows for his failure to join
parties that he considered necessary to pursue his Counterclaim.
g.

Unmeritorious Papers. Strand filed a Counter Motion for Summary

Judgment. Judge Dawson denied it because it was untimely filed (long after the
motion cutoff date), failed to conform to Rule 7 and "lack[ed] merit." R. 295 at 296.

Facts Showing Violations of Rule 83(a)(l)(C) in the Eleanor Strand Probate
Case
15.

In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief Under Rule 83 (R. 237),

Nupetco showed Strand's violations of Rule 83(a)(l){C) in the following instances:
a.

Unmeritorious Papers. In violation of Rule 1 l(a), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, since he was represented by Attorney Nathan Drage at the time, Strand
filed a prose Motion to Disqualify Judge (R. 624) and an Affidavit in Support of
Motion to Disqualify Judge on December 15, 2014, seeking to disqualify Judge Kay.
That Motion had no substance and was, upon referral to Judge Morris, denied on
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December 24, 2014, "[b]ecause Mr. Strand's allegations relate only to procedural
and legal determinations made by Judge Kay that do not suggest bias or partiality."
R. 623.

b.

Unmeritorious Paper for Unnecessary Discovery. In violation of Rule

1 l(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, since he was represented by Attorney Nathan
Drage at the time, Strand (acting prose) obtained issuance from the Clerk of the
Court and filed and served on Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company, LLC a
Subpoena on December 22, 2014. The discovery was unnecessary, by seeking
private information regarding its sale of oil to Tesoro, which had no relevance
whatsoever to the Probate Case. The Court quashed the Subpoena by Order Re

@

Statement of Discovery Issues (Motion to Quash and for Protective Order) dated
January 12, 2015. R. 645.
c.

Unmeritorious Papers. In violation of Rule 1 l(a), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, since he was represented by Attorney Nathan Drage at the time, Strand
filed in the Probate Case a prose Motion to Waive Fees on January 23, 2015, with
an accompanying Affidavit Supporting Motion to Waive Fees. The Affidavit was

false and substantially failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-302. The
Court denied the Motion to Waive Fees.
d.

Unmeritorious Papers. In violation of Rule 11 (a), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, since he was represented by Attorney Nathan Drage at the time, Strand
filed in the Probate Case a prose Memorandum Demonstrating Inability to Pay Fees
on February 19, 2015, in which he again failed to comply with Utah Code Ann.
22

•

§ 78A-2-302 in that, among other things, he failed to disclose his bank account
balance, failed to disclose complete information regarding his business interests,
including B.I. Associates, Strand Apartments and Stronghold Development.
16.

On May 27, 2015 Strand filed a Verified Memorandum in Opposition to

Motion for Relief Under Rule 83 (R. 853), supplemented by an errata filed on June 1, 2015
(R. 1108).

•

17.

Nupetco filed a Reply Memorandum on June 22, 2015. R. 1121.

18.

Hearing on the Rule 83 Motion was held on August 13, 2015. On September

29, 2015, Judge Hamilton issued a Ruling and Order on the Rule 83 Motion (R. 1834), in
•

which he held "the plain language of Rule 83 does not permit the Court to find that a person
has re-litigated the same issue oflaw or fact as an issue oflaw or fact not raised in the case
before it" (R. 1837) and "in any action" in subparagraph (C) "allows the Court to review
only Mr. Strand's filings in the action in which the Rule 83 motion was brought." R. 1838.
Based on those conclusions, the court denied the Rule 83 Motion.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Interpretation of Rule 83, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, follows the rules of
statutory construction. First, consideration is given to the express language of the Rule and
cases interpreting it. No reported cases have been found interpreting Rule 83 in Utah. The
Rule is to be read as a whole and its provisions harmonized.
Judge Hamilton did not read the Rule as a whole, but rather relied on a narrow
reading of the word "claim," which he applied to various provisions to reach unintended
and unsupportable results, namely: that Rule 83 ( 1) "does not permit the Court to find that

23

a person has re-litigated the same issue of law or fact as an issue of law or fact not raised
in the case before it" (R. 1837); and (2) "allows the Court to review only Mr. Strand's
filings in the action in which the Rule 83 motion was brought". R. 1838.
Nupetco demonstrated in its Verified Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief
Under Rule 83 that Strand, acting pro se, without legal representation,
After a claim for relief or an issue of fact or law in the claim has been
finally determined, two or more times re-litigate[ d] or attempt[ ed] to
re-litigate the claim, the issue of fact or law, or the validity of the
determination against the same party in whose favor the claim or issue
was determined.
Rule 83(a)(l)(B). The foregoing requirements were satisfied with regard to four separate
"claim[s] for relief or an issue of fact or law in the claim, after the claim has been finally
determined": the disqualification issue in the eviction action, as shown in Facts ,r ,r 6 to 10,
above; regarding the validity of the execution sale, as shown in Facts ,r 11, above; validity
of the Amended Summary Judgment in the eviction action, as shown in Facts ,r 12, above;
and ownership of Pages Lane, in the Eleanor Strand Probate case, as shown in Facts ,r 13,
above.
Nupetco demonstrated in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief Under
Rule 83 that Strand, in two actions, had three or more times committed the acts specified
in subparagraphs (a)(l)(C)(i) to (iii) of Rule 83. The two actions are the eviction action
and the Eleanor Strand Probate Case.
This court should reverse Judge Hamilton's Ruling on Rule 83 and declare Strand a
vexatious litigant.
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ARGUMENT

I.

INTERPRETATION OF RULE 83, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE

The interpretation of a procedural rule is done consistent with the general rules of
statutory construction. Arbrogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, LLC, 2010 UT 40,238
P. 3d 1035. The primary rule is "When interpreting a rule of civil procedure, we look to
the express language of that procedural rule and to the cases interpreting it." Id. ,I 16.
-,

Application of this principle will be limited in this case to the express language of the Rule,
since this appears to be a case of first impression before the appellate courts of Utah.
Another rule of interpretation is that "[w]e read the plain language of [our rules of civil
procedure] as a whole and interpret [their] provisions in harmony with other [rules]."
Aequitas Enterprises, LLC v. Interstate Investment Group, LLC, 2011 UT 82, 276 P.3d 923

(brackets as in Aequitas).
A.

Interpretation of Rule 83(a)(l)(B).

Four ofNupetco's claims are based upon Rule 83(a)(l)(B), which provides:
The court may find a person to be a "vexatious litigant" if the person
... without legal representation, does any of the following:
(a)(l)(B) After a claim for relief or an issue of fact or law in
the claim has been finally determined, the person two or more
additional times re-litigates or attempts to re-litigate the claim,
the issue of fact or law, or the validity of the determination
against the same party in whose favor the claim or issue was
determined.
The first phrase requires a claim or claim for relief, defined as "a petition, complaint,
Ci)

counterclaim, cross claim or third-party complaint" (Rule 83(a)(2)), or an issue of fact or

~
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law in the claim to be finally determined. "Finally determined" is not defined in the Rule,
and the use of that term in subparagraph (a)(l)(A) does not provide any assistance in its
interpretation, which is discussed below. The "finally determined" claim or issue of fact or
law in the claim is the predicate to the acts that can cause a person to be a vexatious litigant.
The acts specified are that the person "two or more additional times re-litigates or attempts
to re-litigate the claim, issue of fact or law, or the validity of the determination against the
same party ..." The Rule does not require that the claim is finally determined in an action
where the party appeared prose, but the subsequent re-litigation or attempts to re-litigate
must be pro se.
In considering the definition of "claim" and referring to the requirement of Rule
83(c)(l)(B) that "there is no reasonable probability that the vexatious litigant will prevail
on the claim," The trial court in its Ruling concluded: "The Court assumes the term 'the
claim' was used advisedly, and in conjunction with Rule 83(a)(l )(B), finds that the claim,
or issue of fact or law in the claim, must also be at issue in the present action." R. 1836.
Since the claims asserted by Nupetco, as the bases for its Rule 83(a)(l)(B) re-litigation
actions, and each arose from an earlier case, Judge Hamilton held: "the plain language of
Rule 83 does not permit the Court to find that a person has re-litigated the same issue of
law or fact as an issue of law or fact not raised in the case before it." R. 183 7.
On the contrary, the trial court's interpretation failed to consider the plain language
and purpose of Rule 83 as a whole, or, alternatively, did not properly apply the limiting
condition of subparagraph (c)(l)(B). Nupetco recognizes possible uncertainties or
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ambiguities in the Rule, but suggests those can be harmonized in considering the purpose
Ci

of the Rule.
The Texas Court of Appeals, interpreting the "vexatious litigant" provisions of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which is similar to Utah's Rule 83, stated that
"the Texas legislature sought to strike a balance between Texans' right of access to their
courts and the public interest in protecting defendants from those who abuse the Texas
court system by systematically filing lawsuits with little or no merit." Drum v. Calhoun,
299 S.W. 3d 360 {Tex. App.-Dallas 2009). The Supreme Court of California has stated:
"The vexatious litigant statutes ... are designed to curb misuse of the court system by those

<ib

persistent and obsessive litigants who, repeatedly litigating the same issues through
groundless actions, waste the time and resources of the court system and other litigants."
Sha/ant v. Girardi, 253 P.3d 266 (Cal. 201 I). Those statements coincide with the obvious

purposes of Utah's Rule 83.
To harmonize subparagraphs (a)(l)(B) and (c)(l)(B), the latter should be construed
to mean the "claim in the present action," rather than the claim which has been finally
determined, as the context of the "claim" addressed in each subparagraph is inconsistent
with the other. This interpretation is supported by subsection (c)(2), suggesting that the
finding required in (c)(l)(B) is "preliminary" and "is not a decision on the ultimate merits
of the vexatious litigant's claim." To suggest that the word "claim" in (a)(l )(B) and
(c)(l)(B) has the same meaning would thus be nonsensical, as the first has been "finally
Ql

determined" while the latter use of the term is "preliminary" to "the ultimate merits of the
... claim."
27

The alternative construction, adopted by the trial court, is that the word "claim" in
subparagraph (c)(l)(B) means the claim which had been finally determined as stated in
subparagraph (a)(l)(B). The claims and issues Nupetco asserts under subparagraph
(a)(l)(B), the disqualification issue, the execution sale issue, the Amended Summary
Judgment issue, and the ownership of Pages Lane issue, had already been finally
determined in other cases. If "claim" means the same claim in both parts of the Rule, then
the only conclusion possible under (c)(1 )(B) was that there was no probability that the
vexatious litigant would prevail on the claim presented in the case sub Judice, the case at
bar.

Under this interpretation, the trial court should have found the requirement of

(c)(l)(B) was satisfied. But, if this analysis is followed, the provisions of (c)(2) become

•

meaningless.
The trial court's interpretation would require the "vexatious litigant" claim for relief
under Rule 83 to be asserted in the primary action, or in his words, "the claim or issue of
fact or law in the claim, must also be at issue in the present action." Cases in California
and Texas do not support that approach. The Texas Code analyzed in Drum v. Calhoun,
299 S.W. 3d 360 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009) provides:
A court may find a plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant if the defendant shows that
there is a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation and
A. [similar provision to Utah's Rule 83(a)(l)(A)]; or
B. After a litigation has been finally determined against the plaintiff, the
plaintiff repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria persona,
either:
(A)
the validity of the determination against the same defendant as to who
the litigation was finally determined; or
(B)
the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or
law determined or concluded by the final determination against the same
defendant as to whom the litigation was finally determined; or
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C. . . .
(I)

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.§ 11.054, Drum at 365. The appellate court referred to
the statute "which allows the trial court to determine that a pro se plaintiff is a vexatious
litigant if the plaintiff attempts to relitigate the validity of an adverse final determination

in a prior litigation, or any of the claims or issues finally determined in a prior litigation."
Drum at 367 (italics added).The orders determining the plaintiff a vexatious litigant were
affirmed.
The Texas court referred to "prior litigation," while the statute does not use that
term. Re-litigation, whether in the same or separate actions can be the basis of a vexatious
•

litigant determination. Thus, if the provisions of Rule 83 are to be harmonized, as the rule
of statutory construction requires, the claims in prior actions must be considered in
connection with the re-litigation element of (a)(l)(B) of Rule 83.
Another question that arises in the interpretation of Rule 83(a)(l)(B) is the meaning
of "finally determined." Do those words mean when the claim or issue of law or fact in
the claim has been finally determined by the trial court, in a final, appealable order? Or
when all appeals have been exhausted? The words are not defined in Rule 83, but are also
used in subparagraph (a)(l)(A), although that subparagraph provided no obvious assistance

xi

in interpretation. Among the cases in which the words "finally determined" were found,
the most recent, State of Utah, in the interest of HJ., MJ. and J.M v. State of Utah, 986
P .2d 115 (Utah App. 1999) is the most helpful, other cases being 80 to 90 years old. In
this case, "finally determined" is not derived from a statute or rule of civil procedure, but
is used by the Utah Court of Appeals as the description of the determination in the trial
29

court which creates a final, appealable order, namely in that case, whether a grandmother's
legal rights and status in relation to the children had been "finally determined"; since not,
"she could not have appealed [the temporary custody] order. Id. at 123, il 31. See also ilil
27 and 29.
Rule 62(a) requires the expiration of 14 days after entry of judgment before
execution or other writ to enforce a judgment may issue. Otherwise, a judgment is final
for purposes of execution and other writs to enforce the judgment unless a stay is imposed,
as under Rule 62(b), Rule 62 (d), or in the case of multiple claims the court imposes a stay
or conditions on the claim on which final judgment has been granted. Thus, even if a
judgment is appealed, absent a stay it may be enforced by the judgment creditor. Rule 54(b)
in effect until November 1, 2015, during the time Nupetco made its Rule 83 motion,
allowed a court to enter a "final judgment" as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims.
Another reason for adopting the appealable order of the trial court as when a claim
or issue of law or fact is final for purposes of Rule 83 is that "A judgment or order, once
rendered, is final for purposes of res judicata until reversed on appeal or modified or set
aside in the court of rendition." Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 390
(Utah App. 1987). See also, Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P. 2d 227, 230-31 (Utah
1992).
"Finally determined" for purposes of Rule 83 should be interpreted to mean a final
determination by the trial court. Such an interpretation would foster the purposes of Rule

83 by allowing a litigant to put the question to a court whether another litigant is a
30
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"vexatious litigant" at the earliest opportunity. Otherwise, lengthy delay may occur before
Qi!)

the issue may be presented. For example, in the eviction action, the Amended Summary
Judgment, entered July 15, 2008, became an appealable order on September 15, 2008 when
"Defendants' Rule 59 Motion for New Trial and Motion to Amend the Judgment ... " was
denied by Order Denying Rule 59 Motion. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the
Amended Summary Judgment on September 23, 2010, just over two years later, and
Strand's petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the Utah Supreme Court on January
26,2011.
B.

Interpretation of Rule 83(a)(l)(C)

A person may be designated a "vexatious litigant" if, acting pro se, "In any action,
the person three or more times does any one or any combination of" four specified acts,
the fourth of which (a)(l)(C)(iv) is not presented in this appeal. 3 There was no dispute
about the specified acts. The critical issue, in the eye of the trial court, was whether the
acts occurred in the Pages Lane quiet title action before it. In the Ruling, Judge Hamilton
stated and held:
Reading subparagraph (C) as a whole, the Court finds that the
language "in any action" allows the Court to review only Mr. Strand's
filing in the action in which the Rule 83 motion was brought. ...

See Ruling, footnote 4, "for the Court to make any findings under (iv) would require the
Court to take evidence to discern Mr. Strand's intent."

3
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Nupetco has not argued that any of Mr. Strand's pleadings, discovery,
or tactics in this action fall under subparagraph (C), although Nupetco
asserts pleadings in two other actions indicate Mr. Strand is a
vexatious litigant. The Court accordingly concludes that Nupetco has
not shown by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Strand is a
vexatious litigant under subparagraph (C) in the present action.
R. 1950-51.
Rule 83(a)(l)(C) does not say "in the present action," but says "in any action."
"Any" is defined as "a grammatical word used to indicate one, some, or several, when the
quality, type, or number is not important," and "an unlimited or indefinite amount." Encarta
World English Dictionary, St. Martin's Press, 1999. If its plain meaning applies, "any"
cannot be restricted to the present action only.
Rule 83 looks to prior conduct to determine if a person is a vexatious litigant.
Subparagraph (a)(l)(A) looks to "the immediately preceding seven years" for at least five
claims for relief determined against the person. Subparagraph (a)(l)(B) will consider relitigation of a claim previously determined. Subparagraph (a)(l)(C) specifies "in any
action" the person three or more times commits any one or a combination of four specified
acts, clearly anticipating, and requiring, a court's review of conduct in prior actions.
Subparagraph (a)(l)(D) addresses actions in a purported court other than specifically
recognized courts. All are couched to evaluate a person's prior activity to determine if the
definition of "vexatious litigant" is established, for the purpose of eliminating continued
improper use of the courts and costs to the courts and litigants.
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<i

"In any action" means prior and current actions in which a person, such as Strand,
(i)

has committed the specified acts in the specified number of times and within any specified
time limits.

II.

STRAND ATTEMPTED TO RE-LITIGATE THE
DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE NUMEROUS TIMES

The disqualification issue arose in the eviction action on the Bountiful House,
commenced in 2007. Under Rule 83 (a)(l)(B), Strand's counterclaim seeking quiet title of
<I

the Bountiful House constitutes "a claim for relief' and the July 15, 2008 Amended
Summary Judgment constituted a final determination of Strand's counterclaim.
Nupetco asserts that the quiet title claim was "finally determined" for purposes of
the first phrase ofRule 83(a)(l)(B) by the Amended Summary Judgment, and that Strand
two or more times re-litigated or attempted to re-litigate the validity of the judgment by
challenging the authority of Judge Dawson, as asserted in the Motion to Disqualify. The
Motion to Disqualify sought to have the Amended Summary Judgment nullified, thus
challenging the "validity of the determination against the same party [Golden Meadows]

ti)

in whose favor the claim or issue was determined."
On October 14, 2008, Strand filed the Motion to Disqualify, which was denied by
Judge Kay on October 31, 2008 and affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals, 2010 UT App
258, filed September 23, 201 O; petition for certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court was
denied, 247 P.3d 774, January 26, 2011. Possible dates that Strand's counterclaim was
"finally determined" under Rule 83 in connection with the July 15, 2008 Amended
Summary Judgment include: September 15, 2008 when Strand's Rule 59 Motion for New
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Trial and Motion to Amend the Judgment was denied; October 31, 2003 when the Motion
to Disqualify was denied; October 31, 2008 order, the date of the decision of the Utah Court
of Appeals; or January 26, 2011, the date of the denial of petition for certiorari by the Utah
Supreme Court.
After all of those dates, whichever is applicable, acting pro se, Strand attempted to
re-litigate the disqualification issue against Golden Meadows on at least five subsequent
occasions:

I.

In the eviction case, Motion for New Trial, June 3, 2011. See Facts, ,r 6;

2.

Civil Rights Complaint against Judge Dawson. See Facts,

,r 7

(Although

Golden Meadows was not named as a party, the relief sought was to nullify
the Amended Summary Judgment. Thus, the re-litigation was "against the
same party [Golden Meadows] in whose favor the claim or issue was
determined.");
3.

In the eviction case, Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order and Motion
to Dismiss, January 17, 2012. See Facts, ,r 8;

4.

In the joint venture suit, Motion for Relief, [date]. See Facts, ,r 9; and

5.

In the eviction case, Rule 59 Motion, May 15, 2014. See Facts, ,r 10.

To summanze this basis for a vexatious litigant determination under Rule
83(a)( 1)(B):
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•

Element of Rule 83(a)(l)(B)
A claim for relief/ issue of fact or law in
the claim.
Finally determined

Re-litigated

The claim, the issue of fact or law, or the
validity of the determination
Against the same party in whose favor the
claim or issue was determined

Facts
In the eviction action, Strand's
counterclaim/Motion to Disqualify Judge
Dawson
September 15, 2008 (denial of Rule 59
Motion for New Trial), or
October 31, 2008 (denial of Motion for
Disqualification), or
January 26, 2011 (Strand's petition for
writ of certiorari denied by Utah Supreme
Court)
Seven times: see Facts ,r,r 6 to I 0, above,
all after the latest date under "Finally
determined"
Motion to Disqualify Judge Dawson
Golden Meadows

Nupetco has met all of the elements of Rule 83 (a)(l)(B). Nupetco is entitled to a
determination that Strand is a "vexatious litigant" and remand to the trial court for the relief
@

authorized by Rule 83.

III.

STRAND ATTEMPTED TO RE-LITIGATE THE VALIDITY OF
THE EXECUTION SALE ON TWO OR MORE OCCASIONS.

At public auction on November 28, 2008, Golden Meadows purchased all claims of
Strand against Neuman Petty, Nupetco, and all other "Neuman Petty entities," including
all claims asserted or which could be asserted in Strand v. Petty, et al., Civil No.
~

070915796. 4 See Facts, ,r 4. Golden Meadows filed a motion to determine the validity of

@

4

liD

Judge Hamilton's Ruling at p. 3 refers to "the validity of the Execution Sale of the
Bountiful residence." However, the execution sale was on Strand's claims and causes of
action in the indicated case, not on the Bountiful residence.
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the execution sale. Judge Dawson determined the sale was valid; an order to that effect was
entered May 19,2011.
Strand, acting pro se, attempted to re-litigate the May 19 Order or its validity in the
following instances:
1.

In the eviction case, June 3, 2011, Rule 59 Motion for New Trial (Facts,

if 12.a.);
2.

Appeal from denial of Motion for New Trial; affirmed by Utah Court of
Appeals (Facts, if 12.b.);

3.

In joint venture suit, Motion for Relief (Facts, iJ 12.c.);

4.

Civil Rights Complaint against Judge Dawson. See Facts,

if 7

(Although

Golden Meadows was not named as a party, the relief sought was the same,
to nullify the Amended Summary Judgment. Thus, the re-litigation was
"against the same party [Golden Meadows] in whose favor the claim or issue
was determined.");
Nupetco satisfied the elements of Rule 83 (a)(l)(B) as shown in this summary:
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Element of Rule 83(a)'1 )(8)
A claim for relief or issue of fact or
law in the claim.

Finally determined

Re-litigated
The claim, the issue of fact or law, or
the validity of the determination
Against the same party in whose favor
the claim or issue was determined

Facts
Claim: Strand' s Counterclaim in the
eviction action
Issue in the claim: validity of
execution sale
May 19, 2011 (Judge Dawson's Order
Determining Validity of Execution
Sale)
Four times: see ,r,r 1 to 4, above and
Facts ,i,i 7 and 12.a., b., and c.
Validity of execution sale
Golden Meadows

Strand is a vexatious litigant. The trial court's Ruling and Order should be reversed.

IV.

STRAND ATTEMPTED TO RE-LITIGATE THE AMENDED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AT LEAST TWO TIMES

The Amended Summary Judgment was entered on July 15, 2008. The Utah court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Golden Meadows Properties, LC v. Strand, 2010 UT
App 257, filed September 23, 2010.
Strand re-litigated or attempted to re-litigate the Amended Summary Judgment on
the following occasions:
1.

In the joint venture action before Judge Kennedy, April 27, 2012, Motion for
Relief (Facts,

2.

,r 12.a.);

Civil Rights Complaint against Judge Dawson, May 17, 2011 (Facts,

1 7)

(Although Golden Meadows was not named as a party, the relief sought was
the same, to nullify the Amended Summary Judgment. Thus, the re-litigation
was "against the same party [Golden Meadows] in whose favor the claim or
issue was determined.");
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3.

In the eviction case, on May 20 2014, Affidavit of Cari Allen in Support of
Rule 59 Motion (Facts, 1 12.c.); and

4.

In the eviction case, Notice of Appeal (Facts, 1 12.d.).

Nupetco satisfied the elements of Rule 83(a)(l)(B) as shown in this summary:

Element of Rule 83(a)(l)(B)
A claim for relief or issue of fact or law in
the claim.

Finally determined

Re-litigated

Against the same party in whose favor the
claim or issue was determined

Facts
In the eviction action
Claim: Strand's Counterclaim
Issue in the claim: validity of the
Amended Summary Judgment
September 15, 2008 (denial of Rule 59
Motion for New Trial), or
October 31, 2008 (denial of Motion for
Disqualification), or
January 26, 2011 (Strand's petition for
writ of certiorari denied by Utah Supreme
Court)
Four times, see paragraphs 1 to 4, above
and Facts 112.a., b., c., and d., all after the
latest date under "Finally determined"
Golden Meadows

Strand is again a vexatious litigant. This Court should reverse the trial court and
enter a decision finding that Strand is a vexatious litigant as a matter oflaw.

V.

STRAND ATTEMPTED TO RE-LITIGATE THE OWNERSHIP OF
PAGES LANE TWO OR MORE TIMES.

Judge Kay in the Eleanor Strand Probate Case determined in the Determination of
Heirs in March of2007 that Pages Lane belonged to Eleanor Strand upon the death of Vern
Strand. R. 482. The "claim for relief or an issue of fact or law in the claim" was the
ownership of Pages Lane; it was finally determined by the Determination of Heirs, March
7, 2006; the claim or issue in the claim was decided in favor of the Personal Representative
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of the Estate of Eleanor Strand (then Diane DiMeo, later as to the events listed below, Kent
G

Alderman). Strand has attempted to re-litigate that issue in the following ways:
1.

Filing a pro se Complaint in this case against Kent Alderman and Nupetco
on January 29, 2015, alleging that Pages Lane belongs to Strand or B.I.
Associates (Facts ,r 13.a.);

2.

Filing a pro se Petition for Extraordinary Writ against Judge Kay, with Kent
Alderman and Nupetco as parties, in the Utah Court of Appeals on February
4, 2015 (Facts ,r 13.b.); and

3.

Filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Mandamus against Judge Morris, with
Kent Alderman and Nupetco as parties, in the Utah Court of Appeals on
February 4, 2015 (Facts ,r 13.c.).

Nupetco satisfied the elements of Rule 83 (a)(l)(B) as shown in this summary:

Element of Rule 83(a)(l)(B)
A claim for relief/issue of fact or law
in the claim.

Finally determined
Re-litigated

Against the same party in whose favor
the claim or issue was determined

Facts
Claim: Petition for Adjudication of
Intestacy, Determination of Heirs, and
Formal Appointment of a Personal
Representative
Issue in the claim: ownership of Pages
Lane
March 7, 2006
Three times, see ,r,r 1 to 3, above and
Facts ,r 13.a., b., and c., all subsequent
to the date under "Finally determined"
Personal Representative of the Estate
of Eleanor Strand

Nupetco has satisfied the requirements of Rule 83(a)(l)(B) for the Court to
@

determine that Strand is a vexatious litigant.
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VI.

STRAND, IN SEVERAL ACTIONS, THREE OR MORE TIMES
COMMITTED ONE OR MORE OF THE ACTS SPECIFIED IN
RULE 83(a)(l)(C)

Strand, in two actions set forth below, three or more times committed an act
specified in subparagraphs (a)(l)(C)(i) to (iii) of Rule 83.

A.

In the Eviction Case.

In the eviction case, Strand committed the following acts, specified in subparagraph
(a)(l)(C)(i) to (iii) of Rule 83:
1.

September 27, 2007, Motion to Set Counter Possession Bond and supporting
Memorandum, unmeritorious paper (Facts il 14.a.)

2.

November 9, 2007, Strand's Disclosure of Lay Witnesses, unmeritorious
paper (Facts il 14.b.)

3.

January 8, 2008, Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories,
unmeritorious papers for unnecessary discovery (Facts il 14.c.)

4.

January 8, 2008, unmeritorious papers for unnecessary discovery (Facts,

il

14.d.);

5.

January 29, 2008, unmeritorious papers (Facts, ,I 14.e.);

6.

February 13, 2008, unmeritorious papers (Facts, ,r 14.f.); and

7.

February 21, 2008, unmeritorious papers (Facts, ,r 14.g.).

B.

Eleanor Strand Probate Case.

In the Eleanor Strand Probate case, Strand committed the following acts, specified
in subparagraph (a)( I )(C)(i) to (iii) of Rule 83:
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1.

December 15, 2014, unmeritorious papers,pro se Motion to Disqualify Judge
and Affidavit in Support of Motion to Disqualify Judge, although represented
by attorney Nathan Drage who did not sign the motion (Facts, ,r 15.a.);

2.

Unmeritorious paper for unnecessary discovery, acting pro se, obtained
issuance of Subpoena issued December 22, 2014, although represented by
attorney Nathan Drage (Facts, ,r 15.b.);

3.

January 23, 2015, unmeritorious papers: prose Motion to Waive Fees with
accompanying Affidavit, although represented by attorney Nathan Drage
(Facts, ,r 15.c.); and

4.

February

19,

2015,

unmeritorious

papers,

pro

se

Memorandum

Demonstrating Inability to Pay Fees, although represented by attorney
Nathan Drage (Facts, ,r 15.d.).

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Nupetco has demonstrated six instances in which Michael Strand has met the
criteria to be determined to be a "vexatious litigant" under Rule 83(a)(l), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Four of those arise under Rule 83(a)(l)(B), as demonstrated above, and
two arise under Rule 83(a)(l)(C).
This Court should rule that the trial court's interpretation of Rule 83(a)(l)(B), that
"the claim, or issue of fact or law in the claim must also be at issue in the present action,"
and its interpretation of Rule 83(a)(l)(C), "that the language 'in any action' allows the
Court to review only Mr. Strand's filings in the action in which the Rule 83 motion was
brought" were both erroneous and reverse the Ruling and Order on the Rule 83 Motion.
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This Court should (1) declare that Strand is a "vexatious litigant" under Rule
83(a)(l)(B) by reason of his multiple attempts to relitigate the four matters identified by
Nupetco, (2) if needed, remand to the trial court for a determination of whether Strand is
a "vexatious litigant" under the criteria of Rule 83(a)(l)(C), and (3) remand to the trial
court for further relief (such as prefiling orders as to future claims).
DATED this 25th day of April, 2016.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By:~~~~
Attorneys for Nupetco Associates, LLC
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Certificate of Compliance with Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(f)(l)(A)
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Brief, exclusive of cover sheet, table
of contents, table of authorities and addendum, contains 12,030 words, 1,171 lines, as
determined by the word count feature of Microsoft Word.
DATED this 25 th day of April, 2016.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By:

~~A4
wayeG.Petty

I

Attorneys for Nupetco Associates, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that two copies of the foregoing was served on each of the
following persons by depositing the same in the mail, first class postage prepaid, on
April 25, 2016, addressed as follows:

Michael Strand
PO Box 1304
Centerville, UT 84014
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Rule 83. Vexatious litigants.
(a) Definitions.
(a)(1) The court may find a person to be a "vexatious litigant" if the person, including an
attorney acting pro se, without legal representation, does any of the following:
(a)(1 )(A) In the immediately preceding seven years, the person has filed at least five
claims for relief, other than small claims actions, that have been finally determined
against the person, and the person does not have within that time at least two claims,
other than small claims actions, that have been finally determined in that person's favor.
(a)(1 )(B) After a claim for relief or an issue of fact or law in the claim has been finally
determined, the person two or more additional times re-litigates or attempts to re-litigate
the claim, the issue of fact or law, or the validity of the determination against the same
party in whose favor the claim or issue was determined.
(a)(1 )(C) In any action, the person three or more times does any one or any
combination of the following:
(a)(1 )(C)(i) files unmeritorious pleadings or other papers,
(a)(1 )(C)(ii) files pleadings or other papers that contain redundant, immaterial,
impertinent or scandalous matter,
(a)(1 )(C)(iii) conducts unnecessary discovery or discovery that is not proportional
to what is at stake in the litigation, or
(a)(1 )(C)(iv) engages in tactics that are frivolous or solely for the purpose of
harassment or delay.
(a)(1 )(D) The person purports to represent or to use the procedures of a court other
than a court of the United States, a court created by the Constitution of the United States
or by Congress under the authority of the Constitution of the United States, a tribal court
recognized by the United States, a court created by a state or territory of the United
States, or a court created by a foreign nation recognized by the United States.
(a)(2) "Claim" and "claim for relief' mean a petition, complaint, counterclaim, cross claim
or third-party complaint.
(b) Vexatious litigant orders. The court may, on its own motion or on the motion of any
party, enter an order requiring a vexatious litigant to:
•

(b)(1) furnish security to assure payment of the moving party's reasonable expenses,
costs and, if authorized, attorney fees incurred in a pending action;
(b)(2) obtain legal counsel before proceeding in a pending action;
(b)(3) obtain legal counsel before filing any future claim for relief;
(b)(4) abide by a prefiling order requiring the vexatious litigant to obtain leave of the court
before filing any paper, pleading, or motion in a pending action;
(b)(5) abide by a prefiling order requiring the vexatious litigant to obtain leave of the court
before filing any future claim for relief; or

https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp083.htm
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(i

(b)(6) take any other action reasonably necessary to curb the vexatious litigant's abusive
conduct.
(c) Necessary findings and security.
(c)(1) Before entering an order under subparagraph (b), the court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that:
(c)(1 )(A) the party subject to the order is a vexatious litigant; and
(c)(1 )(8) there is no reasonable probability that the vexatious litigant will prevail on
the claim.

@;)

(c)(2) A preliminary finding that there is no reasonable probability that the vexatious
litigant will prevail is not a decision on the ultimate merits of the vexatious litigant's claim.
(c)(3) The court shall identify the amount of the security and the time within which it is to
be furnished. If the security is not furnished as ordered, the court shall dismiss the vexatious
litigant's claim with prejudice.

i)

(d) Prefiling orders in a pending action.
(d)(1) If a vexatious litigant is subject to a prefiling order in a pending action requiring
leave of the court to file any paper, pleading, or motion, the vexatious litigant shall submit
any proposed paper, pleading, or motion to the judge assigned to the case and must:
(d)(1)(A) demonstrate that the paper, pleading, or motion is based on a good faith
dispute of the facts;
(d)(1)(8) demonstrate that the paper, pleading, or motion is warranted under existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
(d)(1)(C) include an oath, affirmation or declaration under criminal penalty that the
proposed paper, pleading or motion is not filed for the purpose of harassment or delay
and contains no redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter;

<9

(d)(2) A prefiling order in a pending action shall be effective until a final determination of
the action on appeal, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
(d)(3) After a prefiling order has been effective in a pending action for one year, the
person subject to the prefiling order may move to have the order vacated. The motion shall
be decided by the judge to whom the pending action is assigned. In granting the motion, the
judge may impose any other vexatious litigant orders permitted in paragraph (b).
(d)(4) All papers, pleadings, and motions filed by a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling
order under this paragraph (d) shall include a judicial order authorizing the filing and any
required security. If the order or security is not included, the clerk or court shall reject the
paper, pleading, or motion.

(i)

8

(e) Prefiling orders as to future claims.
(e)(1) A vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order restricting the filing of future claims
shall, before filing, obtain an order authorizing the vexatious litigant to file the claim. The
presiding judge of the judicial district in which the claim is to be filed shall decide the
application. In granting an application, the presiding judge may impose in the pending action
any of the vexatious litigant orders permitted under paragraph (b).
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(e)(2) To obtain an order under paragraph (e)(1 ), the vexatious litigant's application
must:
(e)(2)(A) demonstrate that the claim is based on a good faith dispute of the facts;
(e)(2)(B) demonstrate that the claim is warranted under existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
(e)(2)(C) include an oath, affirmation, or dec1aration under criminal penalty that the
proposed claim is not filed for the purpose of harassment or delay and contains no
redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter;
(e)(2)(D) include a copy of the proposed petition, complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third party complaint; and
(e)(2)(E) include the court name and case number of all claims that the applicant has
filed against each party within the preceding seven years and the disposition of each
claim.
(e)(3) A prefiling order limiting the filing of future claims is effective indefinitely unless the
court orders a shorter period.

i)

(e)(4) After five years a person subject to a pre-filing order limiting the filing of future
claims may file a motion to vacate the order. The motion shall be filed in the same judicial
district from which the order entered and be decided by the presiding judge of that district.
(e)(5) A claim filed by a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order under this paragraph
(e) shall include an order authorizing the filing and any required security. If the order or
security is not included, the clerk of court shall reject the filing.
(f) Notice of vexatious litigant orders.

(f)(1) The clerks of court shall notify the Administrative Office of the Courts that a prefiling order has been entered or vacated.
(f)(2) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall disseminate to the clerks of court a list
of vexatious litigants subject to a prefiling order.
(g) Statute of limitations or time for filing tolled. Any applicable statute of limitations or
time in which the person is required to take any action is tolled until 7 days after notice of the
decision on the motion or application for authorization to file.
(h) Contempt sanctions. Disobedience by a vexatious litigant of a pre-filing order may be
punished as contempt of court.

(i) Other authority. This rule does not affect the authority of the court under other statutes
and rules or the inherent authority of the court.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, DAVI CO N 'i, 9 2015
STATEOFUTAH,FARMINGTONDEPAR ~iir2NoURT

I

--·

MIKE STRAND, INDIVIDUALLY, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE GENERAL PARTNER OF BJ.
ASSOCIATES, A UTAH PARTNERSHIP, AND IN
HIS CAPACITY AS THE LAST SURVIVING
PARTNEROFB.l.ASSOCIATES,A UTAH

RULING and ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF
UNDER RULE 83 (VEXATIOUS
LITIGANT)

PARTNERSHIP; AND B.I. ASSOCIATES, A
UTAH PARTNERSHIP,

vs.
KENT ALDERMAN, PERSONAL

Case No. 150700084

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ELEANOR

Judge David R. Hamilton

AMELIA (MILLIE) NEWBERRY STRAND,
DECEASED; AND NUPETCO ASSOCIATES,

LLC, FORMERLY KNOWN AS NUPETCO
ASSOCIATES, LP,
Defendants.

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on Defendant Nupetco Associates, LLC's
(''Nupetco") Motion for Relief under Rule 83 filed with a supporting memorandum on April 22,

2015. On April 27, 2015, Plaintiff Mike Strand ("Mr. Strand") filed a memorandum in
opposition, supplemented by an errata to the memorandum filed on June 1, 2015. Nupetco filed a
reply memorandum on June 22, 2015. The Court heard argument on August 13, 2015. The Court,
having considered the parties' arguments and supporting documentation, herein issues its Ruling
and Order.

ANALYSIS
At issue in this action is whether Mr. Strand, through various actions related to his claims
of ownership to real property, either individually or through his partnership B.I. Associates,
qualifies as a vexatious litigant under Rule 83. Relevant to the allegations against Mr. Strand in

1
001834

this motion, the Comt may find a person acting "without legal representation" to be a vexatious
litigant under Rule 83(a)(l)(B) if the Court finds that:
After a claim for relief or an issue of fact or law in the claim has
been finally determined, the person two or more additional times
re-litigates or attempts to re-litigate the claim, the issue of fact or
law, or the validity of the determination against the same party in
whose favor the claim or issue was determined. 1
· The Court may also find Mr. Strand is a vexatious litigant under subparagraph (C) if, "[i]n any
action,"2 Mr. Strand "three or more times"3 has done any of the following:
(i) files unmeritorious pleadings or other papers;
(ii) files pleadings or other papers that contain redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter;
(iii) conducts unnecessary discovery or discovery that is not
proportional to what is at stake in the litigation, or;
(iv) engages in tactics that are frivolous or solely for the purpose of
harassment or delay. 4

Re-litigation ofIssues ofLaw or Fact
Nupetco argues that Rule 83 permits the Court to review the issues of law and fact
litigated in other cases, which are not issues of law and fact before the Court in the present
action. Nupetco asserts that Mr. Strand has attempted to re-litigate (1) the disqualification of the
Honorable Judge Dawson as a means of attacking the judgment against Mr. Strand in an eviction

1 Utah

R. Civ. P. 83(a)(l)(B).

2

Utah R. Civ. P. 83(a)(l)(C).

3

Utah R. Civ. P. 83{a)(l)(C).

4

Utah R. Civ. P. 83(a)(l)(C). At the August 13, 2015 evidentiary hearing, counsel for Nupetco voluntarily

restricted its Rule 83 Motion to subparagraph (B), re-litigation of a fact or issue, and subparagraphs (C)(i) and (ii),
noting that for the Court to make any findings under (iv) would require the Court to take evidence to discern Mr.
Strand's intent.

2
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case dealing with a piece ofreal property ("Bountiful residence"); (2) the validity of the
Execution Sale of the Bountiful residence; (3) a July 2008 summary judgment ruling against Mr.
Strand's quiet title claim regarding the Bountiful residence; and (4) ownership of the Pages Lane
Property. Many of the actions Nupetco cites are Rule 59 Motions and appeals.
lv!r. Strand argues that under Rule 83(a)(l)(B), a person must attempt to re-litigate a

claim to qualify as a vexatious litigant. Because the issue of Judge Dawson's disqualification is
not a claim, Mr. Strand contends, his actions in contesting the denial of his request for Judge
Dawson's recusal cannot be used to support a vexatious litigant finding.
As a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether Rule 83 permits it to review
claims, issues of law or fact, and determinations in other cases but not at issue in the action in
which the Rule 83 motion was brought. The Court looks to the plain language of Rule 83,
reading the rule "as a whole and interpret[ing] [its] provisions in hannony with other rules." 5
Prior to entering an order requiring a vexatious litigant to acquire counsel, furnish
security, or abide by prefiling restrictions, the Court "must find by clear and convincing evidence
that the party subject to the order is a vexatious litigant and there is no reasonable probability
that the vexatious litigant will prevail on the claim. " 6 The Court assumes the term "the claim"
was used advisedly, and in conjunction with Rule 83(a)(l)(B), finds that the claim, or issue of
fact or law in the claim, must also be at issue in the present action. The Court notes that allowing
a court to find a person to be a vexatious litigant for re~litigating issues of fact or law that are
distinct and separate from those issues of fact or law raised in the case before it may lead to
forum shopping or similarly undesirable behavior.

5 Aequitas
6

Enlerprises, LLCv. Interstate Inv. Group, LLC, 2011 UT 82, fl 11, 17,267 P.3d 923.

Utah R. Civ. P. 83(c)(I).
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The Court therefore concludes that the plain language of Rule 83 does not permit the
Court to find that a person has re-litigated the same issue of law or fact as an issue of law or fact
not raised in the case before it. Because the issues of Judge Dawson's disqualification, the
validity of the Execution Sale of the Bountiful residence, and the July 2008 summary judgment
ruling against Mr. Strand's quiet title claim regarding the Bountiful residence are not before the
Court in this action, the Court will not review those issues to determine if Mr. Strand is a
vexatious litigant.
Ownership of the Page Lane Property, however, is at issue in the present action. Mr.
Strand, acting prose, filed the present action for quiet title on January 29, 2015. The real
property at issue is two parcels ofland at 680 West and 1600 North, West Bountiful, Utah and
676 West 1600 North, West Bountiful, Utah, together referred to as the "Pages Lane Property."
The issue of ownership of the Pages Lane Property was first detennined in case no. 063600007,

In the Matter of the Estate ofEleanor Amelia ("Millie") Newberry Strand ("Eleanor Strand
probate case"} Mr. Strand was represented by John T. Caine. On March 7, 2006, the Honorable
Judge Thomas Kay issued a Detennination of Heirs in the Eleanor Strand probate case, finding
that Eleanor Strand owned the Pages Lane Property at the time of her death. 7
Ownership of the Pages Lane Property was again at issue in case no. 123700456, In the

Matter ofthe Estate of Vern C. Strand ("Vern Strand probate case"). Mr. Strand was represented
by Nathan Drage. On November 7, 2013, the Honorable Judge Robert J. Dale found that
ownership of the Pages Lane Property automatically passed by operation of law from Vern
Strand to Eleanor Strand upon Vern Strand's death. 8

7

Determination of Heirs, case no. 063600007, ,i 8.

g

Hr'g Mins .• case no. 123700465, Nov. 7, 2013; Order, Jan. 9, 2014, p. 3.
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As acknowledged by Nupetco at the August 13, 2015 hearing, Mr. Strand was
represented by counsel in the first two actions regarding ownership of the Pages Lane Property.
The plain language of Rule 83 requires that a vexatious litigant is a person acting "without
representation." The Court therefore finds that litigation of the issue of ownership of the Pages
Lane Property cannot, at this time, constitute a basis for finding Mr. Strand to be a vexatious
litigant under subparagraph (B).

Unmeritorious Pleadings
Subparagraph (C) permits the Court to find a person to be a vexatious litigant if the
person, three or more times in any action, files unmeritorious pleadings or papers or pleadings or
papers that contain redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. Subparagraph (C)
also provides that a court may fmd a person to be a vexatious litigant if he conducts unnecessary
or disproportionate discovery or engages in ''tactics that are frivolous or solely for the purpose of
harassment or dely.',
Reading subparagraph (C) as a whole, the Court finds that the language "in any action"
allows the Court to review only Mr. Strand's filings in the action in which the Rule 83 motion
was brought. The plain language of Rule 83 does not grant a district court authority to review
and determine the merit of pleadings or conduct in actions not before it, and such an
interpretation would lead to an absurd result.
As a practical matter, it would be difficult and unwise for the Court to review and
determine whether a party's tactics were intended to harass, or his discovery requests were
disproportionate in a case not before it. What discovery is necessary varies widely among
actions; likewise, a party's conduct may be appropriate under the circumstances of one case and
not another. The judge presiding over a particular action is in the best position to determine the
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necessity of a party's discovery and his tactics, as well as the merit and appropriateness of the
content of his pleadings. 9
Nupetco has not argued that any of Mr. Strand's pleadings, discovery, or tactics in this
action fall under subparagraph (C), although Nupetco asserts pleadings in two other actions
indicate Mr. Strand is a vexatious litigant. The Court accordingly concludes that Nupetco has not
shown by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Strand is a vexatious litigant under
subparagraph (C) in the present action.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Relief
under Rule 83 is DENIED. This Ruling and Order constitutes the Court's order on Defendant's
motion; no separate order need be prepared or submitted.

DATED this

.L:j

day of September, 2015.

avid R. Hamilt
District Court Judge

9 Despite

Nupetco's contention that the Court can review the docket and assess merit by the ultimate

judgment on the claims brought in the actions cited, the Court notes that "unmeritorious" means more than a
favorable judgment. Cf Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 (requiring a claim or defense lack merit for an award of
attorney's fees under bad faith statute) and Outsource Receivables Mgmt., inc. v. Bishop, 2015 UT App 41,112,
344 P.3d 1167 (noting that an unmeritorious defense must be not only unsuccessful, but also asserted by a party who
"could not have reasonably believed it to have a basis in law and fact").
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing RULING and ORDER, postage
prepaid, to the follmving:
James C. Swindler
Wayne G. Petty
Prince, Yeates & Oeldzahler
15 West South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Mike Strand
P.O. Box 1304
Centerville, Utah 84014

1-4day of September, 2015.

SIGNED and DATED this

f~~
Judicial Assistant
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